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Understanding the Network-Level Behavior of Spammers





This paper studies the network-level behavior of spammers,
including: IP address ranges that send the most spam, com-
mon spamming modes (e.g., BGP route hijacking, bots), how
persistent (in time) each spamming host is, botnet spam-
ming characteristics, and techniques for harvesting email ad-
dresses. This paper studies these questions by analyzing an
18-month trace of over 10 million spam messages collected
at one Internet “spam sinkhole”, and by correlating these
messages with the results of IP-based blacklist lookups, pas-
sive TCP fingerprinting information, routing information,
and botnet “command and control” traces.
We find that a small, yet non-negligible, amount of spam
is received from IP addresses that correspond to short-lived
BGP routes, typically for hijacked addresses. Most spam
was received from a few regions of IP address space. Spam-
mers appear to make use of transient “bots” that send only
a few pieces of email over the course of a few minutes at
most. These patterns suggest that developing algorithms to
identify botnet membership, filtering email messages based
on network-level properties (which are less variable than an
email’s contents), and improving the security of the Internet
routing infrastructure, may be prove extremely effective for
combating spam.
1. Introduction
This paper presents a study of the network-level character-
istics of unsolicited commercial email (“spam”). Much at-
tention has been devoted to studying the contents of spam,
but comparatively little attention has been focused on spam’s
network-level properties. Conventional wisdom often asserts
that most of today’s spam comes from botnets, and a large
fraction of spam comes from Asia, and a few studies have
attempted to quantify some of these characteristics [11].
Unfortunately, little is known about what quantity of spam
comes from botnets vs. other techniques (e.g., short-lived
route announcements, open relays, etc.), the geographic and
topological distribution of where most spam originates (in
terms of Internet Service Providers, countries, and IP address
space), the extent to which different spammers use the same
network resources, the stationarity of these properties over
time, and so forth. A primary goal of this paper is to shed
some light on these relatively unstudied questions.
Beyond simply exposing spammers’ behavior, gathering
information about the network-level behavior of spam could
well prove to be a huge asset for designing spam fil-
ters that are based on spammers’ network-level behavior.
Whereas spammers have the flexibility to alter the content
of emails—both per-recipient and over time as users update
spam filters—they have far less flexibility when it comes to
altering the network-level properties of the spam they send.
Specifically, our insight is that it is far easier for a spam-
mer to alter the content of email messages to evade spam fil-
ters than it is for that spammer to change the ISP, IP address
space, or botnet from which spam is sent.
Towards the goal of developing techniques that will help
in the design of more robust network-level spam filters, this
paper characterizes the network-level behavior of spammers
as observed at spam sinkholes for two domains. The trace at
one domain contains all spam received at the domain since
August 2004 and serves as our primary dataset. The trace at
the second domain contains all spam received at a newly reg-
istered domain since November 2005; while its spam volume
to date is modest, the fact that we can observe spam arrival
at this domain from “time zero” has allowed us to better un-
derstand harvesting techniques.
We perform a joint analysis of the data collected at these
sinkholes, together with packet traces, an archive of BGP
route advertisements as heard from the receiving network,
traceroutes from the receiving mail relay to the spammer’s
mail relay at the time the relay sent the mail, traces from
the botnet “command and control” of the Bobax worm, and
traces of legitimate email from the border router of a large
campus network. Although many aspects of mail headers can
be forged, we base our analysis strictly on properties of the
sender that cannot be forged (e.g., the IP addresses that made
connections to our mail servers, passive TCP fingerprints,
packet traces of those connections, corresponding route an-
nouncements, etc.). We draw the following surprising con-
clusions from our study:
• The vast majority of received spam arrives from a
few concentrated portions of IP address space. (Sec-
tion 4). Many models of worm propagation assume a
uniform distribution of vulnerable hosts across IP ad-
dress space (e.g., [25]), and spam filtering techniques
currently make no assumptions about the distribution
of spam across IP address space. In fact, we find that
the vast majority of spamming hosts—and, perhaps not
coincidentally, most Bobax-infected hosts—lie within
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a small number of IP address space regions (predomi-
nantly 61.* – 80.* and 200.* – 215.*).
• Most received spam is sent from transient Windows
hosts, each of which sends a relatively small volume
of spam (Section 5). Most bots send a relatively small
volume of spam (i.e., less than 100 pieces of spam over
18 months), and about three-quarters of them are only
active for a single time period of less than two minutes
(65% of them send all spam in a “single shot”).
• A small set of spammers continually use short-lived
route announcements remain untraceable (Section 6).
A small portion of spam is sent by sophisticated spam-
mers, who briefly advertise IP prefix space, establish
an SMTP connection to the victim’s mail relay, and
withdraw the route to that IP address space after the
client sends spam. Anecdotal evidence has suggested
that spammers exploit the routing infrastructure to re-
main untraceable [1, 26]; this paper quantifies and doc-
uments this activity for the first time. To our surprise,
we discovered a new class of attack, where spammers
attempt to evade detection by hijacking large IP ad-
dress blocks (e.g., /8s) and sending spam from widely
dispersed “dark” IP addresses within this space.
• Harvesting entities and spamming appear to be con-
ducted from distinct infrastructure, if not totally sepa-
rate organizations (Section 7). This finding also sug-
gests that filtering spam by observing entities that first
perform harvesting is not likely to be successful—in
fact, these “crawlers” never appear to send spam.
We readily acknowledge that our spam corpus represents
only a single vantage point, and, as such, drawing general
conclusions about Internet-wide spam is not possible. Our
goal is not to present conclusive figures about Internet-wide
characteristics of spam. Indeed, the data we have collected is
a small, localized sample of all spam traffic, and our statistics
may not be reflective of Internet-wide characteristics. The
spam we have collected still represents an interesting dataset
since it reflects the complete set of spam received by two In-
ternet domains. This dataset exposes spamming as a typical
network operator for a single Internet domain might also wit-
ness it. This unique vantage point can help us better under-
stand whether the features of spam that any single network
operator observes can be useful in developing more effective
filtering techniques.
Beyond this practical utility, this paper’s joint analysis of
several datasets provides a unique window into the network-
level characteristics of spam. To our knowledge, this paper
presents the first study that examines the interplay between
spam, botnets, and the Internet routing infrastructure.
With these goals in mind and an understanding of the con-
text of our data, we offer the following additional observa-
tions on the implications of our results for the design of more
effective techniques for spam mitigation, which we revisit in
more detail in Section 8. First, the ability to trace the iden-
tities of spammers hinges on securing the routing infrastruc-
ture. Second, the uneven distribution of spam (and botnet ac-
tivity) across IP space—and the differences in this distribu-
tion from legitimate email—suggests that spam filters and in-
trusion detection systems might monitor network-wide spam
arrival patterns for changes in these distributions to detect
anomalies such as a surge in spam activity. This characteris-
tic also suggests that individual spam filters might be able to
attribute higher levels of suspicion to spam originating from
IP address space with higher spam activity. Given the tran-
sient nature of most spamming hosts, incorporating general
network-level properties of spammers may ultimately pro-
vide significant gains over more traditional filtering methods
(e.g., content-based filtering).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on spamming and an overview of pre-
vious related work. In Section 3, we describe our data col-
lection techniques and the datasets we used in our analy-
sis. In Section 4, we study the distribution of spammers,
spamming botnets, and legitimate mail senders across IP ad-
dress space. Section 5 presents our findings regarding prop-
erties of the infrastructure used by spammers, in particular
the relationship between the spam received at our sinkholes
and known spamming bots. Section 6 examines the extent
to which spammers use transient IP addresses—specifically,
short-lived BGP route announcements—to send spam un-
traceably. In Section 7, we describe preliminary case stud-
ies of harvesting we have observed at a newly created spam
sinkhole. Based on our findings, Section 8 offers positive rec-
ommendations for designing more effective mitigation tech-
niques. We conclude in Section 9.
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of known spam-
ming techniques. Although many of these spamming tech-
niques have been acknowledged anecdotally, several of them
(e.g., does spam actually arrive from short-lived BGP route
announcements?) have not been confirmed or quantified
prior to this study.
2.1 Spam: Methods and Mitigation
In this section, we provide background on the main tech-
niques used by spammers to send email, as well as some of
the more commonly used mitigation techniques.
2.1.1 Spamming Methods: Old and New
Spammers use various techniques to send large volumes of
mail while remaining as untraceable as possible, including:
Botnets. Conventional wisdom suggests that the majority
spam on the Internet today is sent by botnets—collections
of machines acting under one centralized controller [27, 4,
5]. The W32/Bobax (“Bobax”) worm (of which there are
many variants), exploits the DCOM and LSASS vulnerabili-
ties [17], allows the infected hosts to be used as a mail relay,
and attempts to spread itself to other machines affected by
the above vulnerabilities, as well as over email. Agobot and
SDBot are two other bots purported to send spam [10].
Direct spamming. Spammers often purchase upstream
connectivity from “spam-friendly ISPs”, which turn a blind
eye to the activity. Occasionally, spammers buy connectiv-
ity and send spam from ISPs that do not condone this ac-
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tivity and are forced to change ISPs. To avoid renumbering
problems in these cases, spammers sometimes obtain a pool
of dialup IP addresses, send outgoing traffic from the high-
bandwidth connection, and proxy the reverse traffic through
the dialup connection back to the spamming hosts [22].
BGP spectrum agility. This paper exposes a new type
of cloaking mechanism—BGP “spectrum agility”—whereby
spammers briefly announce (often stolen) IP address space
from which they send spam and withdraw the routes to that
IP address space once the spam is sent, in order to remain
untraceable. Although anecdotal evidence has suggested that
spammers use may use this technique [1], our study finds
that spammers may be using spectrum agility to complement
spamming by other methods. This paper documents several
interesting cases of this activity.
Open relays and proxies. Some SMTP servers will al-
low any client to connect to it for the purposes of sending
email. Originally intended for convenience purposes (e.g.,
to let users send mail from a particular SMTP server while
traveling or otherwise in a different network), open relays
were readily exploited by spammers because the layer of in-
direction allowed them to remain untraceable. It would ap-
pear that the widespread deployment and use of blacklisting
techniques have all but extinguished the use of open relays
to send spam.
2.1.2 Mitigation Techniques
Techniques for stemming the tide of spam are as varied as
the techniques to send spam. One of the most widely used
anti-spam techniques is filtering, which typically classifies
email based on its content; content-based filtering uses fea-
tures of an the contents of an email message’s headers or
body to determine whether an email is likely to be spam.
Content-based filters, such as those incorporated by popu-
lar spam filters such as SpamAssassin [23], have been quite
successful to date at reducing the amount of spam that ac-
tually reaches a user’s inbox. On the other hand, content-
based filtering has drawbacks. Users and system adminis-
trators must continually update their filtering rules and use
large corpuses of spam for training; in response, spammers
continue to come up with new ways of altering the contents
of an email to circumvent these filters. The cost of evad-
ing content-based filters for spammers is negligible, since
spammers can easily alter email contents to attempt to evade
these filters. In contrast, altering the network characteristics
of where spam is being sent from, and how it is being sent, is
more costly. For all the work that has focused on developing
filters based on email contents, scant attention has been de-
voted to the network-level properties associated with spam-
ming behavior.
In addition to performing content-based checks, many
mail filters, including SpamAssassin, also perform lookups
to determine whether the sending IP address is in a “black-
list”. Blacklists of known spammers, open relays, open prox-
ies exist today and remain one of the predominant spam fil-
tering techniques. There are more than 30 widely used black-
lists in use today; each of these lists is separately maintained,
and insertion into these lists ranges is based on many differ-
ent types of observations (e.g., operating an open relay, send-
ing mail to a spam trap, etc.). The results in this paper—in
particular, that IP address space is often stolen to send spam
and that many bot IP addresses are short-lived—indicate that
this long-standing method for filtering spam is likely to be-
come much less effective over time.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we review previous work in three areas:
spam, worms and botnets, and unorthodox interdomain rout-
ing announcements. While previous work has studied each of
these phenomena to some degree in isolation, we believe that
this study is the first to perform a joint analysis of spamming
behavior, botnet characteristics, and Internet routing to better
understand the characteristics and network-level behavior of
spammers.
2.2.1 Previous Studies of Spamming Behavior
A recent presentation from the SpamAssassin project dis-
cusses several techniques that the SpamAssassin spam filter-
ing tool has incorporated to to detect forged X-Mailer head-
ers, weak “hashbusting” schemes, etc. [16]. Although this
work also involves reverse engineering, the project focuses
on analyzing mail contents to reverse-engineering spamming
tools and techniques (with the goal of using this analysis to
incorporate better content-filtering rules into SpamAssassin).
In this paper, we also study properties of spamming behav-
ior, but we focus on network-level properties, rather than ar-
tifacts of spamming software that appear in email content. In
particular, we focus on properties of the spam, such as the
IP address of the last relay from which the mail was sent
before the local domain, which previous work has also ob-
served is one of the few parts of the SMTP header that cannot
be forged [8].
Previous studies have studied the behavior and proper-
ties of worms, botnets, and other spam sources. Casado
et al. used passive measurements of packet traces cap-
tured from about 2,500 spam sources to estimate the bot-
tleneck bandwidths of roughly 25,000 TCP flows from spam
sources and found peaks at common bandwidths (e.g., mo-
dem speeds) [3]. Although we have not yet estimated band-
widths of spammers that send spam to our sinkhole, studying
the passive port 25 packet trace that we have also captured
at our sinkhole is part of our future work. Kumar et al. de-
constructed the source code of the “Witty” worm to estimate
various properties about Internet hosts (e.g., host uptime) as
well as about the propagation of the worm itself (e.g., who
infected whom) [13]. In contrast, our work explores the be-
havior of spammers in depth, although we also peripherally
study malware whose exclusive purpose is to send spam (i.e.,
the “Bobax” drone).
Jung et al. previously performed a study of DNS blacklist
(DNSBL) traffic and the use of blacklists [12] and observed
that 80% of of the IP addresses that were sending spam were
listed in DNSBLs two months after the collection of the traf-
fic trace. Our study also studies the effectiveness of DNSBLs
but examines whether a client is listed in the DNSBL at the
time the corresponding piece of mail was received, and with
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a different dataset. While we also find that about 80% of the
received spam was listed in at least one of eight blacklists,
hosts that employ certain spamming techniques such as BGP
spectrum agility tend to be listed in far fewer blacklists. We
also find that most spam comes from only a handful of ad-
dress ranges; thus, blacklisting on ranges, rather than indi-
vidual IP addresses, may also help improve the effectiveness
of blacklists.
Several previous and ongoing studies are studying spam-
mers’ attempts to harvest email addresses for the purposes of
spamming. Project Honeypot also sinks email traffic for un-
used MX records and hand out “trap” email addresses to har-
vesting behavior and help identify spammers [21]. A previ-
ous study has used the data from Project Honeypot to analyze
the methods spammers use to monitor the time it takes from
when an email address is harvested to the time when that
address first receives spam, the countries where most har-
vesting infrastructure is located, and the persistence (across
time) of various harvesters [20]. We present some prelimi-
nary results from a similar study in Section 7.
In this paper, we correlate spam arrivals with traces of
hosts known to be infected with malware. Moore et al. used
“backscatter” traces to a /8 network to study the spread of
the CodeRed word in July 2001 [18]. Although we do not
study the spread of malware in this paper, their paper’s find-
ings that the majority of hosts—and more than 80% of the
hosts in Asia—did not patch the relevant vulnerability well
after actual outbreak make it more reasonable to assume that
IP addresses of positively identified Bobax drones remain in-
fected across the course of our spam trace.
2.2.2 Unorthodox route announcements
Anecdotal evidence and cursory studies have suggested
that spammers advertise routes to IP prefixes for short
amounts of time to send spam while remaining unde-
tectable [1, 24, 26]. This paper is the first to quantitatively
confirm this suspicion. Feamster et al. performed an empir-
ical study on route advertisements in bogus address spaces
(i.e., private address space or unassigned addresses) [6]. In
Section 6, we document cases where the sending of spam
coincides with short-lived BGP route announcements for IP
prefixes containing the mail relays that send spam. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first to quantify the extent to
which spam originates from mail relays that are only reach-
able for short periods of time.
3. Data Collection
This section describes the datasets that we use in our anal-
ysis. Our primary dataset is are the actual spam email mes-
sages collected at two sinkhole domains. To study the spe-
cific characteristics of certain subsets of spammers, we aug-
ment this dataset with two additional datasets: First, we col-
lect BGP routing data at the upstream border router of the
same network where we are receiving spam and monitor the
routing activity for the IP prefixes corresponding to the IP
addresses from which spam was sent. We also intercept the
“command and control” traffic from the Bobax worm at a
























Figure 1: The amount of spam received per day at our sinkhole from
August 2004 through December 2005.
that were infected with the Bobax worm (and, hence, are
likely members of botnets that are used for the sole purpose
of sending spam).
3.1 Spam Email Traces
To obtain a sample of spam, we registered a domain
and established a corresponding DNS Mail Exchange (MX)
record with no legitimate email addresses. Hence, all mail
received by this server is spam. The “sinkhole” has been
capturing spam since August 5, 2004. Figure 1 shows the
amount of spam that the sinkhole has received per day
through January 6, 2006 (the period of time over which we
conduct our analysis). Although the total amount of spam
received on any given day is rather erratic, the data indi-
cates two unsettling trends. First, the amount of spam that
the sinkhole is receiving generally appears to be increasing.
Second, and perhaps more troubling, the number of distinct
IP addresses from which we see spam on any given day (not
shown in the graph) is also increasing.
We established a second sinkhole in November 2005 to
measure the process by which spammers “ramp up” in send-
ing spam to a domain (e.g., the process by which email ad-
dresses are harvested and exchanged, methods that spam-
mers use for harvesting, etc.). We registered the second do-
main in November 2005, linked to a web site for that do-
main from our personal web pages, and seeded Google’s web
crawler with the domain. On this page, we set up links to a
“contact” web page that randomly generates a list of email
addresses at that domain. Joining these randomly generated
email addresses, as they may become seen at a later date in
our spam logs, allows us to track the “life” of an email ad-
dress from when it was harvested to when we receive spam
from that address (and from whom we receive spam).
In addition to simply collecting spam traces, these spam
sinkholes run MailAvenger [15], a customizable SMTP
server that allows us to take specific actions upon the receipt
of email from a mail relay (e.g., running traceroute to the
mail relay sending the mail, performing DNSBL lookups for
the relay’s IP address, performing a passive TCP fingerprint
of the relay). These sinkholes are hosted by domains that
resolve to mail exchangers that that run the MailAvenger
SMTP server, which we have configured to (1) accept all
mail, regardless of the username for which the mail was des-
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tined and (2) gather network-level properties about the mail
relay from which spam is received. In particular, these mail
servers collect the following information about the mail relay
at the same time that the spam itself was received:
• the IP address of the relay that established the SMTP
connection to the sinkhole
• a traceroute to that IP address, to help us estimate the
network location of the mail relay
• a passive “p0f” TCP fingerprint, based on properties of
the TCP stack, to allow us to determine the operating
system of the mail relay
• the result of DNS blacklist (DNSBL) lookups for that
mail relay at eight different DNSBLs.
Note that, unlike many features of the SMTP header, these
features are not easily forged.
3.2 BGP Routing Measurements
To gain a view of network-layer reachability from the net-
work where spam was received, we co-located a “BGP moni-
tor” in the same network with our spam sinkholes. The mon-
itor receives BGP updates from the border router, and our
analysis includes a BGP update stream that overlaps with al-
most all of our spam trace, ending on December 28, 2005.
Because the monitor has an internal BGP session to the cam-
pus network’s border router, it will not see all BGP messages
heard by the border router. Rather, it will see only BGP mes-
sages that cause a change in the border router’s choice of best
route to a prefix.
Despite not observing all BGP updates, the monitor re-
ceives enough information to allow us to study the proper-
ties of short-lived BGP route announcements. In this study,
we are primarily concerned with whether an IP address of
the mail relay from which we receive spam is reachable and
how long it remains reachable. We are particularly interested
in cases where a route for an IP address is reachable for only
a short period of time, coinciding with time at which spam
was sent. Even though our BGP monitor receives only the
best route for each IP prefix, we can nevertheless determine
whether a prefix is reachable by virtue of the fact that the
monitor will have no route to the prefix at all if the prefix is
unreachable.
3.3 Botnet Command and Control Data
To gain a definitive accounting of hosts that are sending
email from botnets, we use a trace of hosts infected by the
W32/Bobax (“Bobax”) worm from April 28-29, 2005. This
trace was captured by hijacking the authoritative DNS server
for the domain running the command and control of the bot-
net and redirecting it to a machine at a large campus network.
This method was only possible because (1) the Bobax drones
contacted a centralized controller using a domain name, and
(2) the researchers who obtained the trace were able to obtain
the trust of the network operators hosting the authoritative
DNS for that domain name.
This DNS hijacking technique directs control of the botnet
to the honeypot, which effectively disables it for spamming
for this period (i.e., the 1.5-day period in April 2005). On
the upside, since all infected drones now attempt to contact
the honeypot, rather than the intended command-and-control
host, we can take a packet trace to obtain a reasonable esti-
mate for the size of the botnet and the members of the botnet.
To obtain a sample of spamming behavior from known
botnets, we correlate Bobax botnet membership from the
1.5-day trace of Bobax drones with the IP addresses from
which we receive spam in the sinkhole trace. This technique,
of course, is not perfect: over the course of 18 months, hosts
may be patched, in cases of dynamic addressing, multiple
different hosts (some of which may be Bobax-infected and
some of which may not be) may use one of the IP addresses
logged from the Bobax trace. Although we cannot precisely
determine the extent to which the transience of bots affects
our analysis, previous work suggests that, even for highly
publicized worms, the rate at which vulnerable hosts is slow
enough that we can expect that many of these infected hosts
remain unpatched [18].
4. Network-level Characteristics of Spammers
In this section, we study some “traditional” network-level
characteristics of spammers. We survey the portions of IP
address space from which our sinkhole received spam and
the persistence of this distribution over time. While we do
not present specific results to this effect, we find that these
distributions are quite persistent over time. The distribution
of spam senders across IP address space is far from uni-
form, and it differs significantly from the distribution of IP
addresses of senders of legitimate email in certain parts of
the address space. Further, spam arrival by IP prefix is much
more pronounced, persistent, and concentrated than similar
characteristics by IP address. Finally, we find that a large
fraction of spam is received from just a handful of ASes:
nearly 12% of all received spam originates from mail relays
in just two ASes (from Korea and China, respectively), and
the top 20 ASes are responsible for sending nearly 37% of
all spam. This distribution (as well as the main perpetrators)
is also persistent over time.
These network-level characteristics of spam, which the
rest of this section surveys in greater detail, suggests that
spam filters that focus on the relatively small fraction of
/24 prefixes where spam arrives continually would comple-
ment techniques that blacklist based only on individual IP
addresses. This heavily skewed distribution, both in IP space
and by AS number, suggests that spam filtering efforts might
better focus their energy on identifying high-volume, persis-
tent groups of spammers, rather than on blacklisting individ-
ual IP addresses, many of which are transient. As we will
see in Section 5, this conclusion is even stronger when we
restrict our analysis to the set of spamming hosts that are
known to be botnets.
4.1 Distribution Across Networks
The fact that the vast majority of spam originates from a
relatively small portion of the IP address space that differs
from the distribution of legitimate email suggests that it may





























































Figure 2: Fraction of spam email messages and legitimate email ad-
dresses received as a function by IP address space; also, fraction of
client IP addresses that sent spam, binned by /24.
of the IP address space. This distinction also suggests that
it may be possible for a network operator to automatically
detect a sudden influx of spam by tracking the changes in
distribution of IP address space for incoming mail.
To determine the address space from which spam was ar-
riving (“prevalence”) and whether the distribution of across
IP addresses changed over time (“persistence”), we tabulated
the spam in the spam trace by IP address space and found that
spam arrivals across IP space are far from uniform.
Finding 4.1 (IP Address Space Distribution) The major-
ity of spam is sent from a relatively small fraction of IP ad-
dress space.
Figure 2 shows the number of spam email messages received
over the course of the entire trace, as a function of IP address
space. The cumulative graph clearly shows several “knees”,
the most distinctive of which are in the IP address spaces for
cable modems (e.g., 24.*) and in the address space allocated
to the Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) re-
gional Internet registry (e.g., 61.*).
We repeated this study per day across months, per month
across years, and so forth. Surprisingly, this distribution has
remained roughly constant over time. This finding offers two
implications for the design of spam filters. First, although
the individual IP addresses from which spam is received
may change from day-to-day, the fact that spam continually
comes from the same IP address space suggests that spam fil-
ters should incorporate this feature when assessing whether
a piece of email is in fact spam.
Despite the massive spread of Internet hosts across IP
space, Figure 2 suggests that, in fact, most spam is coming
from a relatively concentrated portion of the address space.
We compared this distribution to that of IP addresses of all
mail relays that sent mail to a large campus network and
found that, while the distributions are largely similar, sig-
nificantly more spam than legitimate email comes from the
range from 70.* – 80.*; this characteristic is notable because
several of these blocks (i.e., 77/8, 78/8, and 79/8) are re-
AS Number # Spam AS Name Primary Country
766 580559 Korean Internet Exchange Korea
4134 560765 China Telecom China
1239 437660 Sprint United States
4837 236434 China Network Communications China
9318 225830 Hanaro Telecom Japan
32311 198185 JKS Media, LLC United States
5617 181270 Polish Telecom Poland
6478 152671 AT&T WorldNet Services United States
19262 142237 Verizon Global Networks United States
8075 107056 Microsoft United States
7132 99585 SBC Internet Services United States
6517 94600 Yipes Communications, Inc. United States
31797 89698 GalaxyVisions United States
12322 87340 PROXAD AS for Proxad ISP France
3356 87042 Level 3 Communications, LLC United States
22909 86150 Comcast Cable Corporation United States
8151 81721 UniNet S.A. de C.V. Mexico
3320 79987 Deutsche Telekom AG Germany
7018 74320 AT&T WorldNet Services United States
4814 74266 China Telecom China
Table 1: Amount of spam received from mail relays in the top 20 ASes.
11 of the top 20 networks from which we received spam are primarily
























Figure 3: The distribution of spam messages across the /24 has any hosts
that send spam all IP addresses that send spam and all “active” /24s
(i.e., those that send at least one piece of spam).
served by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
These differences in distribution suggest that spam filters
could assign a higher level of suspicion to email sent from
relays in this address space (particularly the reserved space).
Figure 3 shows that roughly half of the received spam ar-
rives from less than 3% of /24s that receive any spam at all
(only about 486,614 /24s receive any spam at all); half of
the spam comes from only about 0.01% of all /24s. Figure 4
shows that, even though a few IP addresses sent more than
10,000 emails, about 85% of client IP addresses sent less
than 10 emails to the sinkhole, indicating that targeting an in-
dividual IP address will typically not be fruitful in mitigating
spam without sharing information across domains. The con-
centration of spammers in relatively concentrated regions of
IP address space and the relative transience of individual IP
addresses suggests that network operators (and spam filters)
should attribute a higher level of suspicion to spam coming
























Figure 4: The number of distinct times that each client IP sent mail to
our sinkhole (regardless of the number emails sent in each batch).
Finding 4.2 (Distribution of spammers across ASes)
More than 10% of spam received at our sinkhole originated
from mail relays in two ASes, and 36% of all received spam
originated from only 20 ASes.
Recent claims have suggested that most spam in fact orig-
inates in the United States [11]. On the other hand, Figure 2
suggests that a significant number of spamming hosts reside
in an IP address space that is allocated to the Asia-Pacific
region (e.g., 61.0.0.0/8). To perform a rough estimate of the
amount of spam originating from each country, we associ-
ated the ASes from which we received spam to the countries
where those ASes were based. Table 1 shows also the distri-
bution of hosts that sent spam to the sinkhole by country, for
the top 20 ASes from which we received spam.
Finding 4.3 (Distribution of spammers by country)
Although the top two ASes from which we received spam
were from Asia, 11 of the top 20 ASes from which we
received spam were from the United States and comprised
nearly 40% of all spam from the top 20 ASes.
Furthermore, our estimates over 65% of the corpus suggest
that nearly three times as much spam in our trace origi-
nates from ISPs based in the US than from either of the next
two most prolific countries (Korea and China, respectively).
This conclusion does differ from other reports, which also
indicate that the most spam comes from the U.S., but to a
much lesser degree. The fact that most spam comes from a
large number of United States-based providers that also pro-
vide service for many legitimate customers (e.g., Comcast,
Level3, etc.) suggests that filtering spam based on the AS of
the mail relay is not likely to be effective.
4.2 The Effectiveness of Blacklists
Our observations that most spam comes from a small por-
tion of the address space led us to wonder whether filtering
techniques that used network level properties other than a
mail relay’s IP address might improve the effectiveness of
blacklist-based filtering strategies. Indeed, we also wondered
how effective DNSBL filtering based on IP address would
be at all, given that, as shown in Figure 4, most mail relays





















Minimum number of DNSBLS listing this spammer
Spam from bobax drones
All spam
Spam from transient BGP announcements
Figure 5: The fraction of mails that were listed in a certain number of
blacklists or more, at the time each mail was received.
To test this hypothesis, we used the results from real-time
DNSBL lookups performed by MailAvenger at the time the
mail was received at 8 different blacklists.
Figure 5 indicates that, in fact, IP-based blacklisting is
still working reasonably well: while 20% of spammers’ IP
addresses were not listed in any blacklist (as shown by the
middle line “all spam”, where about 80% of IP addresses
were listed in at least one blacklist), more than 50% of all
spam was listed in two or more blacklists, and 80% of spam
from known botnets were from IP addresses that were listed
in two or more blacklists. More troubling, however, is that
the spam that we received from spammers using “BGP spec-
trum agility” techniques (as described in Section 2) are not
blacklisted nearly as much: half of these IP addresses do not
appear in any blacklist, and only about 30% of these IP ad-
dresses appear in more than one blacklist.
Finding 4.4 (Effectiveness of blacklists) About 80% of all
spam was received from mail relays that appear in at least
one blacklist. A relatively higher fraction of Bobax drones
were blacklisted, but relatively fewer IP addresses sending
spam from short-lived BGP routes were blacklisted—only
half of these mail relays appeared in any blacklist.
We discuss BGP spectrum agility in more detail in Section 6,
but the general ineffectiveness of blacklists for detecting IP
addresses from this space suggests that this technique is quite
effective and may gain prominence, and possibly used in
conjunction with botnets (which appears to be the predomi-
nant spamming technique, as we discuss in Section 5).
5. Spam from Botnets
In this section, we amass circumstantial evidence which
suggests that a majority of spam originates from bots. Al-
though, given our limited datasets, we cannot determine a
precise fraction of the total amount of spam that is com-
ing from bots, we perform a joint analysis with our trace of
“Bobax” command and control data to study the patterns of
spam that are being sent from hosts that are known to be bots.
First, we study the activity profile of drones from the
“Bobax” worm and find that the IP address space where we




















































Figure 6: The number of all Bobax drones, and the amount of spam
received from those drones at the sinkhole, as a function of IP address
space. On the x-axis, IP address space is binned by /24.
space where we observed spamming activity (Finding 4.1).
Second, we observe that about 95% of the spam received at
our sinkhole appears to be sent by Windows hosts that each
send relatively low volumes of spam.
5.1 Bobax Topology
We studied prevalence of spammers versus the prevalence
of known Bobax drones to gain a better understanding of
how the distribution of IP addresses of Bobax-infected hosts
compared to our observations of IP distribution of spam-
mers in general. Figure 6 shows the results of this analysis,
which shows, surprisingly, that the distribution of all Bobax-
infected hosts is quite similar to that of the distribution of all
spammers (Figure 2).
Finding 5.1 (Bobax distribution vs. spammer distribution)
Spamming hosts and Bobax drones have similar distribu-
tions across IP address space, indirectly suggests that much
of the spam received at the sinkhole may be due to botnets
such as Bobax.
This similarity provides evidence of correlation, not causal-
ity, but the fact that the distribution of IP addresses from
which spam is received more closely resembles botnet activ-
ity than the spread of IP addresses of legitimate email sug-
gests that a significant amount of spam activity may be due
to botnet activity.
Although the range 61.* – 74.* has a sizable number of
Bobax-infected hosts, we see relatively less spam from the
them in this space. One possible explanation for this is that
spammers may be using other techniques besides botnets for
sending spam from many of the hosts in this range. Indeed,
in Section 6, we present findings that suggest that one or
more sophisticated groups of spammers appear to be send-
ing spam from a sizable number of machines (or, perhaps,
a smaller number of machines with changing IP addresses),
numbered from portions of unused IP space (within this IP
address range) that are typically unroutable, except for the
times when they are sending spam.
Operating System Clients Total Spam
Windows 854404 5863112
- Windows 2000 or XP 604252 4060290
- Windows 98 13727 54856
- Windows 95 559 2797














No Fingerprint 204802 2225410
Total 1228403 10103837
Table 2: The operating system of each unique sender of received spam,
as determined by passive OS fingerprinting.
5.2 Operating Systems of Spamming Hosts
In this section, we investigate the prevalence of each oper-
ating system among the spam we received, as well as the total
amount of spam we received from hosts of each type. For this
purpose, we used the passive OS fingerprinting tool, p0f,
which is incorporated into MailAvenger; using this tech-
nique, we can associate each piece of spam with an operating
system. Using this technique, we were able to identify the
operating system for about 75% of all hosts from which we
received spam. Table 2 shows the results of this study. Ap-
proximately half of the hosts from which we receive spam
run Windows; this fraction is surprisingly small, given that
roughly 95% of all hosts on the Internet run Windows [19].
More striking is that, while only about 4% of the hosts
from which we receive spam are from hosts are running op-
erating systems other than Windows, this small set of hosts
appears to be responsible for at least 8% of the spam we
receive. The fraction, while not overwhelmingly large, is no-
table because of the conventional wisdom that most spam
today originates from compromised Windows machines that
are serving as botnet drones.
Finding 5.2 (Prevalence of spam relays by OS type)
About 4% of the hosts sending spam to the sinkhole are not
Windows hosts but our sinkhole receives about 8% of all
spam from these hosts.
A significant fraction of the spamming infrastructure is ap-
parently still Unix-based.1 Over time, this fraction may in
fact increase, both as spammers develop different, more so-
phisticated cloaking techniques.
1Alternatively, this spam might be sent from Windows machines whose
stacks have been modified to emulate those of other operating systems. Al-
though we doubt that this is likely, since most spam filters today do not
employ p0f checks, we acknowledge that it may become more common in
the future, especially as spammers incorporate these techniques.
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5.3 Spamming Bot Activity Profile
The results in Section 5.2 indicate that an overwhelming
fraction of spam is sent from Windows hosts. Because a dis-
proportionately large fraction of spam comes from Windows
hosts, our hypothesis is that many of these machines are in-
fected hosts that are bots. (To test this hypothesis, we intend
to check the distribution of legitimate email by operating
system type, but we have not yet done so.) In this section,
we investigate the characteristics of spamming hosts that are
known to be Bobax drones. Specifically, we seek to answer
the following three questions:
1. Intersection: How many of the known Bobax drones
send spam to our sinkhole?
2. Persistence: For how long does any particular Bobax
drone send spam?2
3. Volume: How much of the spam from Bobax drones
originates from hosts that are only active for a short
period of time?
The rest of this section explores these three questions. Al-
though our trace sees spam from only a small fraction of all
Bobax-infected drones, this sample nevertheless can offer in-
sight into the behavior of spamming bots.
5.3.1 Intersection and Prevalence
To satisfy our personal curiosity (and to compare with
other claims about the amount of spam coming from bot-
nets [4]), we wanted to determine the total fraction of re-
ceived spam that originated from botnets versus other mech-
anisms. The circumstantial evidence we have amassed in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that the fraction of spam that
originates from botnets is quite high. Unfortunately, we have
not yet developed a technique for isolating botnets from mail
logs alone, we can only determine whether a particular piece
of spam originated from a botnet based on whether the IP
address of the relay sending the spam appears in our trace of
machines known to be infected with Bobax.
Even this information is not sufficient to answer questions
about the amount of spam coming from botnets, since ma-
chines other than Bobax-infected hosts may be enlisted in
spamming botnets. Indeed, good answers to this question
depend on both additional vantage points (i.e., sinkhole do-
mains) and better botnet detection heuristics and algorithms.
Not only will more vantage points and better detection algo-
rithms aid analysis, but they may also prove useful for mas-
sively collaborative spam filtering—identification of botnet
membership, for example, could prove a very effective fea-
ture for identifying spammers.
At our spam sinkhole, we receive spam from only 4,693
of the 117,268 Bobax-infected hosts in our command-and-
control trace. This small (though certainly non-negligible)
2Previous work has noted that the “DHCP effect” can create errors in es-
timation for both persistence and prevalence (e.g., a single host could dy-
namically be assigned different IP addresses over time) [18]. Although the
DHCP effect can introduce problems for estimating the total population of a
group of spammers, it is not as problematic for the questions we study in this
paper: since one of our objectives is to study the effectiveness of IP-based
filtering (rather than, say, count the total number of hosts), we are interested
more in measuring the persistence of IP addresses, not hosts.
view into the Bobax botnet emphasizes the need for observ-
ing spamming behavior at multiple domains to observe more
significant spamming patterns of a botnet. Nevertheless, this
set of hosts that appear both in our spam logs and in the
Bobax trace can provide useful insight into the spamming
behavior and network-level properties of individual bots, as
well as a reasonable cross-section of all spamming bots (Fig-
ure 6 indicates that the IP distribution of bots from which our
sinkhole receives spam is quite similar to the distribution of
all bots across IP space).
5.3.2 Persistence
Figure 7 shows the persistence of each Bobax-infected IP
address that sent spam to the sinkhole. The figure indicates
that the majority of botnets make only a single appearance in
our trace; these “single shot” bots account for roughly 25%
of all spam that is known to be coming from Bobax drones.
Finding 5.3 (Single-shot bots) More than 65% of IP ad-
dresses of hosts known to be infected with Bobax send spam
only once, and nearly 75% of these addresses, send spam
to our sinkholed domain for less than two minutes, although
many of them send several emails during their brief appear-
ance.
Of the spam received from Bobax-infected hosts, about 25%
originated from hosts that only sent mail from IP addresses
that only appeared once. The persistence of Bobax-infected
hosts appears to be mildly bimodal: although roughly 75% of
Bobax drones persist for less than two minutes, the remain-
der persist for a day or longer, about 50 persist for about
six months, and 10 persist for entire length of the trace. Al-
though these short-lived bots do not yet send the majority of
spam coming from botnets, this “single shot” technique may
become more prominent over time as network-level filtering
techniques become more sophisticated.
Based on the short lifespans of the majority of bots, we hy-
pothesized that IP-based blacklists (e.g., DNSBL filtering)
are unlikely to be effective in blocking spam from, at least
the 65% of bots that send spam to our sinkholed domain only
once. This hypothesis turns out to be generally incorrect. As
Figure 5 shows, the botnet hosts from which we received
spam were actually more likely to be listed in more DNSBLs
than the typically spamming mail relay. Intuitively, this can
be justified, since other domains likely received spam from
the same drones, even the ones from which our domain only
received a single piece of spam, but this result also demon-
strates the benefits of collaborative spam filtering (of which
DNSBLs are the primary example): they can facilitate iden-
tification of spammers that send only a single piece of spam
to a domain when those spammers recur across domains.
5.3.3 Volume
Figure 8 shows the amount of spam sent for each Bobax
drone, plotted against the persistence of each drone. This
graph shows that most Bobax drones do not send a large
amount of spam, regardless of how long the drone was ac-


































Figure 8: Number of spam email messages received vs. bobax drone
persistence.
trace send fewer than 100 pieces of spam over the entire pe-
riod of the trace. This finding suggests that spammers have
the ability to send spam from a large number of hosts, each of
which is typically used for a short period of time and nearly
always used to send only a relatively small amount of spam.
Thus, not only are IP-based filtering schemes likely to be in-
effective, but volume-based detection schemes for spamming
botnets may also be ineffective.
Finding 5.4 (Spam arrives from bots at very low rates)
Regardless of persistence, 99% of bots sent fewer than 100
pieces of spam to our domain over the entire trace.
Most persistent bots have typically sent no more than 100
pieces of spam, indicating that typical rates of spam from
Bobax drones, for spam received by a single domain, are less
than a single piece of spam per bot per day.
6. Spam from Transient BGP Announcements
Many spam filtering techniques leverage the ability to pos-
itively identify a spammer by its IP address. For example,
DNS blacklists catalog the IP addresses of likely spammers
so that spam filters may later send queries to determine
whether an email was sent by a likely spammer. Of course,
this technique implicitly assumes a connection between an IP
address and the physical infrastructure that a spammer uses
to distribute email. In this section, we study the extent to
which spammers use such transient identities by examining
the extent to which the sinkhole domain receives mail that
coincides with short-lived BGP route announcements.
Anecdotal evidence has previously suggested that some
spammers briefly advertise portions of IP address space, send
spam from mail relays with IP addresses in that space, and
subsequently withdraw the route announcements for that IP
address space after the relays have sent spam [1, 24, 26].
This practice make it difficult for end users and system ad-
ministrators to track spam sources, because the network from
which a piece of spam was sent is likely to be unreachable
at the time a user lodges a complaint. Although it is techni-
cally possible to log BGP routing announcements and mine
them to perform post-mortem analysis, the relative difficulty
of doing so (especially since most network operators do not
monitor interdomain routes in real time) essentially makes
these spammers untraceable. Because this IP address space
is unreachable the vast majority of the time, it is unlikely that
the IP address that sent the spam will even be reachable at the
time when a network operator is investigating the incident.
Little is known about (1) whether the technique is used
much in practice (and how widespread it is), (2) what IP
space spammers tend to use to mount these types of attacks
and (3) the announcement patterns of these attacks. This
study seeks to answer two sets of questions about the use of
short-lived BGP routing announcements for sending spam:
• Prevalence across ASes and persistence across time.
How many ASes use short-lived BGP routing an-
nouncements to send spam? Which ASes are the most
guilty, in terms of number of pieces of spam sent, and
in terms of persistence across time?
• Length of short-lived BGP announcements. How long
do short-lived BGP announcements last (i.e., long
enough for an operator to catch)?
As we will see, sending spam from IP address space cor-
responding to short-lived route announcements is not, by
any means, the dominant technique that spam is sent today
(it accounts for no more than 10% of all spam we receive,
and probably less). Nevertheless, because our domain only
observes spamming behavior from a single vantage point,
this technique may be more common than we are observ-
ing. Additionally, because this technique is not well de-
fended against today, and because it is complementary to
other spamming techniques (e.g., it could conceivably be
used to cloak botnets), we believe that this behavior is cer-
tainly worth attention, particularly since hiacking large pre-
fixes is a practice that represents a significant departure from
conventional wisdom on prefix hijacking.
6.1 BGP Spectrum Agility
Figure 9 shows an example of 61.0.0.0/8 being an-
nounced by AS 4678 for a brief period of time on September
30, 2005, during which spam was also sent from IP addresses
contained within this prefix. (This particular announcement








































Figure 9: Observation of a short-lived BGP route announcement for
61.0.0.0/8, spam arriving from mail relays in that prefix, and the sub-












































Figure 10: Observation of a short-lived BGP route announcement for
82.0.0.0/8, spam arriving from mail relays in that prefix, and the sub-
sequent withdrawal of that prefix.
To investigate further the extent to which this technique is
used in practice, we performed a joint analysis of BGP rout-
ing data (described in Section 3.2) and the spam received
at our sinkhole, which is co-located with the BGP moni-
tor. Given the sophistication required to send spam under the
protection of short-lived routing announcements (especially
compared with the relative simplicity of purchasing access
to a botnet), we doubted that it was particularly prevalent. To
our surprise, there are a small number of parties who appear
to be using this technique to send spam quite regularly. In
fact, looking in further detail at the several (prefix, AS) com-
binations, we observed the following remarkable patterns:
• AS 21562, an Internet service provider (ISP) in
Indianapolis, Indiana (according to ra.net and
arin.net), originated routing announcements for
66.0.0.0/8.
• AS 8717, an ISP in Sofia, Bulgaria, originated an-
nouncements for 82.0.0.0/8.
• In a third, less persistent case, AS 4678, an ISP in
Japan, Canon Network Communications (according
to apnic.net), originated routing announcements for
61.0.0.0/8.
We were surprised that three of the most persistent pre-
fixes involved in short-lived BGP routing announcements
involved such large portions of IP address space. Although
some short-lived routing announcements may be misconfig-
urations [14], the fact that these routing announcements con-
tinually appear, they are for large address blocks, and they
typically coincide with spam arrivals (as shown in Figure 9)
raised our suspicion about the veracity of these announce-
ments. Indeed, not only are these route announcements short-
lived, and hijacked, but they are also for large address blocks.
While the use of large address blocks might initially seem
surprising, the dispersity of IP addresses of the clients send-
ing spam corresponding to the short-lived analysis has sug-
gests the following alternate theory.
Finding 6.1 (Spectrum Agility) A small, but persistent,
group of spammers appear to send spam by (1) advertis-
ing (in fact, hijacking) large blocks of IP address space (i.e.,
/8s), (2) sending spam from IP addresses that are scattered
throughout that space, and (3) withdrawing the route for the
IP address space shortly after the spam is sent.
We have called this technique “spectrum agility” because
it allows a spammer the flexibility to use a wide variety of
IP addresses within a very large block from which to send
spam, thus evading filters in two ways. First, route announce-
ments for shorter IP prefixes are less likely to be blocked by
route filters. Second, the larger IP address block allows the
mail relays to “hop” between a large number of IP addresses,
thereby evading IP-based filtering techniques like DNSBLs.
Judging from Figure 5 and our analysis in Section 4.2, the
technique seems to be rather effective.
Upon further inspection, we also discovered the follow-
ing interesting features: (1) the IP addresses of the mail
relays sending this spam are widely distributed across the
IP address space; (2) the IP addresses from which we see
spam in this address space typically appear only once; (3) on
February 6, 2006, attempts to contact the mail relays that
we observed using this technique revealed that that roughly
60-80% of these hosts were not reachable by traceroute;
(4) many of the IP addresses of these mail relays were lo-
cated in allocated, albeit unannounced and unused IP address
space; and (5) many of the AS paths for these announce-
ments contained reserved (i.e., to-date unallocated AS num-
bers), suggesting a possible attempt to further hamper trace-
ability by forging elements of the AS path. We are at a loss
to explain certain aspects of this behavior, such as why some
of the machines appear to have IP addresses from allocated
space, when it would be simpler to “step around” the allo-
cated prefix blocks, but, needless to say, the spammers using
this technique appear to be very sophisticated.
Whether spammers are increasingly using this technique
is somewhat inconclusive. Still, many of the ASes that send
the most spam with this technique also appear to be relative
newcomers, and it is our belief that variants of this type of
technique may used in the future to make it more difficult
to track and blacklist spamming hosts, particularly since the
technique allows a spammer to relatively undetectably com-
















































Figure 11: CDF of the length of each short-lived BGP episode, in sec-
onds, for ten days in August 2005.
6.2 Prevalence of Spectrum Agility
Because of the volume of data and the relatively high cost
of performing longest-prefix match queries, we performed a
more extensive analysis on a subset of our trace, from August
5, 2005 to August 15, 2005, to detect the fraction of spam
coming from short-lived announcements and to determine a
reasonable threshold for studying short-lived announcements
across the entire trace. Figure 11 shows that, for all of the IP
addresses for which we received spam over the course of ten
days of our trace, 90% of the corresponding BGP routing
announcements were announced continuously for at least a
day. In other words, most of the received spam corresponded
to routing advertisements that were not short-lived. On the
other hand, as much as 10% of all received spam may appear
to coincide with this type of behavior.
Finding 6.2 (Prevalence: Spam from Short-Lived Routes)
Approximately 10% of spam was received from routing an-
nouncements that lasted less than a single day.
Unfortunately for traditional filtering techniques, the
spammers who are the most persistent across time are, for the
most part, not the spammers who send the most spam using
this technique. Indeed, only two ASes—AS 4788 (Telekom
Malaysia) and AS 4678 (Canon Network Communications,
in Japan)–appear as one of the top-10 most persistent and
most voluminous spammers using short-lived BGP routing
announcements.
6.3 How Much Spam from Spectrum Agility?
A comparatively small fraction of spam originates from
IP addresses that correspond to short-lived BGP route an-
nouncements (i.e.routing announcements that persist for less
than a day) that coincide with spam arrival. The total amount
of spam received as a result of this technique seems to pale
in comparison to other techniques—no more than 10% of all
spam received appears to be sent using this technique. Al-
though this technique is not apparent for most of the spam
we receive (after all, a botnet makes traceability difficult
enough), the few groups spammers that do use this technique
typically use it quite regularly. We also observed that many
of the ASes where this technique has been witnessed for the
longest period of time do not, in fact, rely on this technique
for sending most of their spam. Even the most prolific spam-
ming AS in this group, Malaysia Telekom, appears to send
only about 15% of their spam in this fashion.
Finding 6.3 (Persistence vs. Volume) The ASes from where
spammers most continually use short-lived route announce-
ments to send spam are not the same ASes from which the
most spam originates via this technique.
Many ASes that advertise short-lived BGP routing an-
nouncements that coincide with spam do not appear to be hi-
jacking IP prefixes to do so. In the case where spam volume
is high, these short-lived routing announcements may simply
coincide with spam being sent via another means (e.g., from
a botnet). The ASes that persistently advertise short prefixes,
however, appear to be doing so intentionally.
7. A Preliminary Survey of Harvesting
To better understand the harvesting techniques used by
spammers, we established a new domain and pointed its
DNS mail exchanger (MX) record to our second spam sink-
hole, as mentioned in Section 3.1. Establishing this domain
has allowed us to observe the relationship between har-
vesting to actual spam arrival, similar to that which being
performed in other studies [21]. After registering the MX
record, we built a web site for that domain, with a “con-
tacts” list that consists of randomly generated, non-existent
email addresses at that domain. Since these email addresses
are random combinations of letters, it is very unlikely that
email sent to those addresses are the result of a dictionary at-
tack. We also log a list of the email addresses that are fed to
clients accessing the contact page, together with other infor-
mation such as time of crawling, client IP, HTTP User Agent,
etc.). By combining these logs with the “To:” addresses to
which we receive spam, we were able to identify some of the
techniques spammer use to harvest email addresses and send
spam.
The domain was registered on November 19, 2005, and the
SMTP server (MailAvenger [15]) was set up on December 6,
2005. The setup is similar to our primary sinkhole’s config-
uration: email to any username is accepted and logged.
Though our first two pieces of spam appeared within 5
days, it appeared to be a random attack: an analysis of their
headers and our logs showed no evidence of email being re-
ceived to “fed” addresses. Our first real evidence of active
harvestation of email addresses, a Phishing [2] attack ap-
peared over the course of a day starting on January 20th,
2006, from two Windows machines. Three days after the first
attack, one of the machines spammed our domain again, un-
der the guise of a different organization.
An analysis of the attack unearthed a number of interest-
ing features. First, all email addresses to which we received
spam from these two machines were harvested in a single at-
tempt on January 16, 2006. The IP address which harvested
the spam was logged as 69.192.210.155, which is IP space
belonging to Rogers Cable, but the IP space of the machines
that sent us spam (65.220.17.5 and 65.220.15.30) belongs
to UUNET Technologies Inc. Though the email addresses
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that we the harvester were in no particular order, the spam-
ming organization appears to have sorted the list alphabet-
ically and delegated approximately half the set to each ma-
chine. We also found that both machines were active at the
same time and sent spam at approximately 15-minute inter-
vals, which indicates some level caution on the spammer’s
part to avoid triggering network alerts. Unsurprisingly, many
of the mail headers were also forged. For instance, the X-
Mailer headers, which usually identifies the Mail User Agent
(MUA), were consistently forged: the same machine had
different X-Mailer strings (“AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub
118”, “Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4133.2400”, “Mi-
crosoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)” etc.) for
consecutive emails it sent.
Although this spam dataset is relatively small compared
to our primary sinkhole, the short interval between harvest-
ing and actual spamming is worrisome. Moreover, all the ad-
dresses that were harvested were spammed within a short pe-
riod. The sophistication of spammers (trying to aviod detec-
tion by not flooding the domain with emails, pre-processing
and balancing the “load” between available machines, tam-
pering with message headers, etc.) and the apparent coopera-
tion between different groups (harvesting from one IP block,
spam from another) are all cause for concern.
8. Lessons for Better Spam Mitigation
Existing spam mitigation techniques have focused on ei-
ther throttling senders (e.g., recent attention has focused on
cost-based schemes [7, 9]) or having receivers filter spam ac-
cording to the content of a message. The results of this paper,
however, highlight several important lessons that strongly in-
dicate that devoting more attention to the network-level prop-
erties of spammers that may be a useful addition to today’s
spam mitigation techniques. Using network-level informa-
tion to help mitigate spam not only provides a veritable font
of new features for spam filters, but network-level properties
have two important properties that could potentially lead to
more robust filtering.
1. Network-level properties are far less malleable than
those based on an email’s contents.
2. Network-level properties may be observable in the
middle of the network, or closer to the source of the
spam, which may allow spam to be quarantined or
disposed of before it ever reaches a destination mail
server.
From our findings, we derive five main insights regarding
the network-level behavior of spammers that could help in
our design of better mitigation techniques.
Lesson 1 Effective spam filtering requires a better notion of
end-host identity.
We observed a non-trivial amount of spam coming from
“one-shot” botnets. The notion of a using an IP address to
pin down a spammer is now meaningless. Short-lived botnets
and short-lived BGP routing announcements (with spectrum
agility) make the notion of pinning an identity to an IP ad-
dress (or even IP prefix space) effectively impossible.
Lesson 2 Detection techniques that are based on distribu-
tions and aggregate behavior are much more likely to expose
nefarious behavior than techniques based on observations of
a single IP address.
Although comprehensive IP-based blacklisting is reasonably
effective (indeed, for 80% of received spam, the IP address of
the sending relay was blacklisted at the time the mail was re-
ceived), blacklisting techniques may also benefit by exploit-
ing other network-level properties such as IP address ranges,
some of which (e.g., 70.* – 80.*, particularly the reserved
blocks within this range) send mostly spam.
Lesson 3 The distribution of spammers (and received) spam
across IP address space is highly skewed, despite the fact
that any given IP address sends a very small amount of spam.
70% of spam is received from only 20% of all IP address
space. This uneven distribution suggests that spam filters
that take into account suspicious regions of IP address space
(rather than simply blacklisting individual IP addresses) may
be a more efficient way of identifying spammers.
Lesson 4 Trends indicate that securing the Internet routing
infrastructure is a necessary step for bolstering identity and
traceability of email senders.
A routing infrastructure that instead provided protection
against route hijacking (specifically, unauthorized announce-
ment of IP address blocks) would make BGP spectrum
agility attacks more difficult. Our study suggests that while
this spamming technique is by no means responsible for
most received spam, several characteristics make the tech-
nique extremely troubling. Most notably, the technique can
be combined with other spamming techniques (possibly even
spamming with botnets) to give spammers more agility in
evading IP-based blacklists. Indeed, our analysis of DNSBLs
indicates that spammers may already be doing this.
Lesson 5 Some network-level properties of spam can be in-
corporated relatively easily into spam filters and may be
quite effective at detecting spam that is missed by other tech-
niques.
Although the BGP spectrum agility attack is particularly
wily—and effective against DNSBLs—incorporating addi-
tional network-level features into spam filtering software
such as “recently announced BGP announcement” should
prove remarkably effective at quenching this attack.
Given the benefits of exploring the benefits that network-
wide analysis could provide for stemming spam, we imag-
ine that the ability to witness the network-level behavior
of spammers across domains could also provide significant
benefits by exposing patterns that are not evident from the
trace of a single domain alone. One organization might be
able amass such a dataset either by sinkholing a large num-
ber of domains; Project Honeypot [21], in fact solicits dona-
tions of MX records (though its corpus is still significantly
smaller than ours)—i.e., for registered domains that do not
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receive email. As we have discovered thus far from our own
experience, attracting spam to a new domain takes some ef-
fort (we found some amusement in the difficulty of attract-
ing spam that we actually wanted). Additionally, in addition
to using sinkholes, network operators might share network-
level statistics of received email from real network domains
to detect anomalous behavior and, possibly pre-empt spam.
9. Conclusion
This paper has studied the network-level behavior of
spammers using a joint analysis of a unique combination of
datasets—an 18-month-long trace of all spam sent to a single
domain with real-time traceroutes, passive TCP fingerprints,
DNSBL lookup results, and traceroutes; a similar, shorter
trace for a domain with a Web server that generates random
email addresses and tracks who harvests them; BGP rout-
ing announcements for the network where the sinkholes are
located; command and control traces from the Bobax spam-
ming botnet; and port 25 packet traces for legitimate mail for
a large campus network.
This comprehensive joint analysis allowed us to study
some new and interesting questions that should guide the de-
sign of better spam filters in the future, based on the lessons
in Section 8. We studied “traditional” network-level behav-
ior (e.g., where in IP space we are receiving spam from) of
spammers and compared these characteristics to those of le-
gitimate email, noting some significant differences that could
help identify spammers by IP space. We also used “ground
truth” Bobax drones to better understand the characteristics
of spamming botnets, finding that most of these drones do
not appear to revisit the same domain twice. While this prop-
erty does not appear to hamper the use of blacklists for iden-
tifying Botnet drones (emphasizing the benefits of collabora-
tive spam filtering), we also find that blacklists were remark-
ably ineffective at detecting spamming relays that sent spam
hosts scattered throughout a briefly announced (and typi-
cally hijacked) IP address block—a new technique we call
“BGP spectrum agility”. Although this technique is lethal
because it makes traceability and blacklisting significantly
more difficult, spam filters that incorporate network-level be-
havior could not only mitigate this attack and many others,
but could also prove to be more resistant to evasion than
content-based filters.
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